It's tearing up my heart (part 2)
Rounding out the climate security policies of the other biggest emitters.
Hi again. We seem to keep living in interesting times, as a friend pointed out a few days ago. What is happening in the Middle East is heartbreaking, and yet another stark reminder that tomorrow is not given to any of us. Let’s not forget to do what we can to ensure we survive so that those after us may too.
If you want to be distracted with a cat photo, just scroll to the bottom of this post, otherwise…
A shift in mindset, both at the personal and institutional / societal levels is critical for us to tackle “game-changer” threats like climate change so that we can just about get through the next 50-100 years. Am I hopeful? I think we MUST be - even if it is playing to different groups’ self interests to achieve something approaching the common good. Altruism and sustained, values-driven international cooperation are not strengths of today’s global system. So we have to nudge, plead, leverage, and at times, compel so that that tackling the physical impacts of climate change is 1) urgent, 2) desirable and 3) necessary for those who hold the levers of capital, politics, labour and ethics. We may have hit part of criteria 1 with the body of analysis and evidence already out there, but we are a long ways off the other two.
This is a nice segway then to part two of the “climate security” policies of some of those powers that be…
🇨🇳China: The nation of 1.3 billion arguably has one of the most progressive and comprehensively policies among the great powers, matched with specific action plans focused on energy transition, greentech, food and water security, as well as climate adaptation. Historically, it comes in second behind the US in cumulative CO2 emissions, much of it after the reform period began in the late 1970s - today it is the largest annual emitter. As one of the countries at greatest exposure to climate change impacts - desertification, sea level rise, flooding, irregular rainfall, extreme heat and disease outbreaks all factor in across a diverse geography - risk management is increasingly central to long-term policy.
Perhaps the policy that most closely fits the climate security bucket is the country’s 2035 climate adaptation action plan (English translation). Over 20 years ago, Beijing recognised the strategy risk and opportunity of the energy transition, positioning itself to become a global leader in green technology and its supply chain - from rare earth minerals to refining technologies and battery development. It has also more or less cornered the global market for solar (80% share of the global manufacturing value chain) and wind components. This gambit from the early 2000s has paid off handsomely thus far. As China progresses into its next phase of economic development, it is seeking to tackle the strategic challenge of climate change relative to a few domestic headwinds:
Demographics (a rapidly aging population with a signifcant gender imbalance)
Sharp imbalances between water availability and use between the north v south, eastern coast and the interior (the Grand Canal connecting the Yellow and Yangtze rivers has sections dating over 2,500 years).
A system of government under which provincial and local authorities have a degree of autonomy in delivering national-level objectives and targets, some of which are vague and at times contradictory. This can lead to a patchwork of policy outcomes and solutions, which sometimes create inefficiencies.
In this context, climate security in the domestic context should be viewed through the lens of supporting the central political objective of continued domestic economic prosperity towards an upper-middle income nation within a secure environment. Floods, droughts, natural disasters and calamities have often been make-or-break moments for past rulers, and this legacy is not lost on the modern political class.
The climate adaptation action plan leverages existing long-standing food security policies alongside more recent developments in water management policies to:
Improve the collection, analysis and application of climate change data - this is perhaps the area where government and private sector have the quickest upside potential given the country’s cutting edge AI ecosystem. Enhancing early warnings, weather forecasts, and informing allocation of public spend on infrastructure at the hyper-local levels are all opportunities.
Improve how urban environments - which is home to 65% of the population - implement best practices, technologies and infrastructure to enhance resilience to physical risks of climate change
Take a more holistic focus on water management - from data analysis to water quality, usage, and distribution - including flood control and disaster response. A particular focus on regions at highest exposure, such as the arid northwest and cities in the central floodplains (e.g. Wuhan, Zhengzhou).
Enhance food security measures including precision agriculture, sustainable practices for soil quality (National Black Soil Conservation Project), and greater incorporation of nature-based solutions
Improving early warning and public health systems to build resilience for scenarios like disease outbreaks which are likely to become more common in a 1.5C+ world. There is alignment with existing focus on improving health care systems driven by the aging population, and digital transformation (“informatization”) of key related government entities and networks.
China has also leveraged its technological leadership and its economic heft to nudge the climate mitigation dialogue towards a manner which suits its domestic and international interests - from leadership in global water management to CO2 emissions reduction targets and disaster response aid - receiving plaudits in parts but often earning criticism from the US, EU and small island nations.
Taken together, much of how China looks at the climate-security nexus is internally focused; climate risk is a top-tier security issue for them. Much remains to be seen as to how effective these policies will become however. Can national and local leaders work effectively enough in concert to deliver over a long period? The stakes are massive: coastal regions account for almost 45% of GDP, including much of its manufacturing and consumer base.
🇬🇧UK: The first country to rapidly industrialise, the United Kingdom ranks eighth in cumulative emissions; its rate has slowed over the past 30 years via de-industrialisation, a steady shift away from coal, a rise in gas and gradual increase in renewables in its energy mix.
The UK since the early 2000s has been grappling with how climate change impacts its national security and defence preparedness - most notably the 2008 Climate Change Act. The Met Office, Ministry of Defence, and the independent Climate Change Committee are key stakeholders within the UK public sector’s ecosystem related to climate security issues. Key priorities include:
Understanding how climate change impacts (and human responses to them) have national security and defence implications
Data and modelling for actionable insights
Military preparedness - from sustainability targets, equipment and force design, reducing carbon footprints and operational resilience - to adapt to fight in increasingly inhospitable environments
Reinforcing critical national infrastructure to be resilient re food, water, energy and transport security
A recent analysis from the Rand Corporation highlights several major challenges facing the UK, some of which are common to most governments attempting to plan long-term around climate risks:
Setting a strategic vision amid an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment and worsening uncertainty on the intensity of physical risks of climate change
Prioritising what really needs to get done amid other national security priorities and economic priorities which present real political and fiscal constraints
Taking a global, collaborative approach on tackling the climate-security nexus, including development aid, defence cooperation, disaster response and humanitarian aid
Pursuing decarbonisation and new technologies while maintaining operational resiliency - the classic “glidepath” issue of how much, how quickly amidst existing pressure on MoD to meet demands under resourcing constraints.
The UK government recognises the impact of climate change on security issues in venues like the UN, acknowledging how human responses like migration create second and third-order security challenges to the island nation. With recent backsliding from the current Sunak government around net zero commitments after over a decade of largely steady Conservative support for decarbonisation - most notably the proliferation of onshore and offshore wind - it is likely that looking at national security via the climate lens is taking a back seat until after the next election by May 2024. The Rand report highlights six major recommendations which sound similar to callouts for the US - these stood out:
Moving away from disaster and crisis-response focused resourcing toward resilience (e.g. fund the prevention not the band-aid or plaster)
Building better public support for approaching climate risks via a national security lens
I would argue that the private sector should play a key role, as it has for the implementation of the net zero policy until this year. Much of the critical infrastructure upon which critical defence and the country’s energy, food and water security is in private ownership. Committing to, and advocating within government for policies which incentivises or requires climate risk-informed asset hardening (think cyber) would be a good place to start.
To go deeper, there’s probably no better place to start than the interview with LTG (retd) Richard Nugee, the sustainability guru with the MoD, on the Cleaning Up podcast series.
🇧🇷Brazil: Latin America’s largest country is among the most exposed to climate change impacts: the destruction of the Amazon into savannah and heavy reliance on hydro power is already changing regional weather patterns, emitting billions of tonnes of CO2 (over 112 Gt in total as of 2021, over 85% of which via land use changes including deforestation) and increasing the country’s vulnerability to erratic, extreme weather events.
In 2020, the International Military Council on Climate and Security published a study on climate security and Brazil. Written during the Bolsonaro era, it highlights the urgent need to wean the country away from overlying relying on hydroelectric power which may become more unreliable as extreme droughts become more common, placing power grid stability at risk over time. It also highlighted the need to counter deforestation activities - the current Lula government has pledged to slow the rate of deforestation, and figures up to August 2023 suggest the rate has slowed by 43% compared to 2022.
Tackling illegal deforestation may be where Brazil can play a major role in the climate-security nexus globally: the trade in illegal timber is part of a broader regional and global ecosystem dominated by organised crime syndicates. In this context, the ability of the Brazilian government, its neighbours and security partners to tackle transnational crime can have significant secondary impacts on reducing the rate of savannahisation, loss of biodiversity and emergence of diseases harmful to people and livestock.
While there has been significant global attention on the Amazon for decades, it is seldom seen through the security lens - Brazil’s allies and investors should not only treat supporting Brazil’s efforts to tackle environmental risks as a sustainability risk issue, but also as a global concern falling within the UN SDG 16 (peace and development) bucket. In Brazil, perhaps more obviously than other jurisdictions, there is a clear nexus between a security dividend at the community and subnational level with green capital toward “bankable” projects for reduced emissions, enhanced biodiversity, and water quality and access.
So what have we learned? The red lines for any country to take a threat seriously is one which is perceived by that country’s political, military and economic elite as a threat to its existence at the top of the proverbial totem pole. IR and polisci wonks would recognise this as anything that jeopardises its political legitimacy, ability to exert a “monopoly of violence” internally, or external recognition of its authority.
Crisis tends to focus minds, though for most of those major countries examined, we are unfortunately yet to see insights translated to action at scale. Hope springs eternal, though.
Recaps
London calling: last month, I attended the University College London’s Early Warnings for All Conference. Three days of fantastic sessions deep diving into the state of play for early warnings for extreme weather, conflict, security events, etc. My takeaway is that while public sector continues to lead on framework and policy, the private sector is advancing rapidly in deploying the technology needed to enable early alert and response systems to function as designed. I particularly enjoyed 1-1 chats with thought leaders in the field, including Professor Ilan Kelman [on what]. There still remain massive gaps to overcome imho:
Different models of incentivising private sector investment beyond a) local and national governments as clients, although there seems to be much runway left, b) tying the usage of such systems with insurance mechanisms. It’s clear these systems will benefit more people today, and into the future as physical impacts become more frequent and intense, so the space for innovation is huge.
Getting the right message to the right people to take action presents major data privacy and information security issues. Governments and companies need to ensure public trust of how their data will be used in such circumstances is above an acceptable level so that when “real deal” alerts come through people do not dismiss or ignore.
What caught my eye this month
Everything everywhere, all at once: a few months ago I came across this piece on how to tackle polycrises, or multiple crisis occurring simultaneously or in short succession. Most of our modern security and resilience systems are designed to deal with one incident or crisis at a time. What happens when systems are strained or distracted to the point of being overwhelmed? How does a team or organisation adapt and invest to handle such uncertainty? While the piece deals with the pure geopolitical context, the reality of climate change impacts on people - and how we respond - are inherently political. Not having our imagination being limited by lived experience, and good scenario planning are two of a number of elements needed. If you want to watch your polycrisis unfold, I recommend The Peripheral, starring Chloe Grace Moretz, where society falls amid a mix of super-sickle cell anaemia/COVID, nukes, AI and war.
Tap-in merchants: Another piece which is making the rounds comes from the Economist, which highlights how the bevy of consultancy outfits, big and small are making the most out of the current geopolitical environment. Combined with market volatility, domestic instability in many countries and increasingly alarmist reporting on extreme weather, this is fertile ground for real and self-professed experts to cash in. Crisis = opportunity. If you’re a corporate security / strategy team - make sure you’re on top of the risks, get over the horizon and position yourself to be the go-to on these matters with your senior leadership. If you are ready, you don’t have to get ready. Otherwise, these merchants could have a day! Of course, if you are the said consultant, secure that bag.
I’m doing some travel for the next few weeks so there may be a delay with the next post, but keen to hear how your “climate security” experience or thinking is evolving. Leave your thoughts in the comments, Substack chat, or on LinkedIn.
In the meantime, to quote Jerry Springer, former mayor of Cincinnati and bestselling author, take care of yourselves, and each other.