New year, old crises
The US confrontation with the Houthis resurfaces an enduring conflict amid the hottest year in recorded history
Another year, another post! Hope you all had a pleasant festive period. It’s January,the home of Blue Monday, Dry January, the NFL playoffs (Bang Bang Niner Gang!), awards season, gym trials, runs on antifreeze and draught excluders, surviving the dark nights (or 40C days if you’re down under). What’s not to love?! If it’s your birthday this month - happy birthday!
🇾🇪 We kick off the new year with one more long-term conflict to add to the 2024 bingo: Yemen.
A bit of scene setting (for the Middle East historians among you, please forgive me for this really abbreviated version of a really complex historiography). The nation has faced decades of conflict largely stemming from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, British rule over parts of the country and World War I. Religious, tribal and geographical factors have long made this region difficult for those looking to bring the region under sustained unified rule. It’s these dynamics, the diverse but arid environment and monsoon patterns which serve as the backdrop, and can often precipitate socio-political crises.
The north-south rivalry in the modern era dates back to the end of the Ottoman period, when Shi’a clerics in the north increasingly pitted against the south. Britain, the US, Egypt, Saudi and the USSR all intervened in one or both sides for the next 70-plus years - periods of relative calm were disrupted by political and tribal uprisings. After Yemen was unified under Ali Abdallah Saleh in 1990, the south continued to agitate militarily for independence albeit not successfully enough to oust Saleh. It took the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the unravelling of the ensuing peace dialogue between north-south, Sunni-Shi’a factions for the Houthis to exploit by seizing control of the northern highlands, with Iranian support. By this point groups like al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have long taken root and the Islamic State was finding its footing too, further destabilising the country. The Saudis duly intervened again in order to prevent a Tehran-supported Shi’a led state taking hold on its southern border - for Riyadh, this was a national security threat in the first degree.
While there has been peace talks between the Houthis and the national governing council (essentially an assembly of groups competing with the Houthis and often each other) have been on-and-off since at least 2018, at first to stop a humanitarian disaster at Hudaydah port, they have been stalled since 2022.
Why does all this matter?
Because I argue, and fear, that what we see in Yemen - a country extremely vulnerable to both the impacts of conflict and climate change - will be happening in more places as we, as a society, are - let’s be blunt - struggling to build the kind of momentum needed to effect to reduce then remove CO2 from our atmosphere ALL THE WHILE keeping the global political system which is needed to climate mitigation to happen from irreversibly faltering.
For Yemen, how this plays into underlying security risks makes for more grim reading. The Fragile States Index, a comparative annual list of countries which measures vulnerability to social, economic, political and security disruption, rates Yemen 2nd most fragile among 179 countries analysed. Notre Dame University’s ND-GAIN index which measures a country’s overall vulnerability to climate change combined with its ability to respond and adapt ensuing physical risks, places Yemen 174th out of 185 rated, consistently scoring among the worst 15-20 countries in food and water vulnerability as well as adaptive capability.
Analysis from the World Bank suggests that under the most likely medium-to-long term climate forecasting for the country (SSP3-7.0, a modelling scenario where the world is 3C warmer than the pre-industrial era by 2100, in a world where regional rivalries - an unstable multipolar system in international relations terms - has significantly slowed international cooperation, the energy transition is uneven at best, and adaptation levels are low) is dire. By 2100 coastal regions may experience over 50 more days of days over 35C and over 20 “tropical nights” where high humidity would make conditions almost unbearable. Yemen is among the most water-scarce and water-stressed countries on earth, with the World Bank estimating over 18 million people lacking consistent access to clean water. While overall rainfall is projected to increase in parts of Yemen as the century goes on, precipitation becomes more intense and weather patterns become more erratic, including the monsoons - which are essential to agriculture, drinking water and recharging underground aquifers.
As I had referenced in previous posts, we absolutely can’t live without water. And in the west we are quite privileged enough to not have to fight over it. But in parts of Yemen violent conflict over water is already happening, including when water infrastructure is damaged after extreme weather events. Responses are localised and ad-hoc because there is fear of investing too much time and resources if the spectres of fighting and damaging weather are ever-present. To go deeper into Yemen’s water infrastructure, this is a good place to start.
⛴️ Connection with the headlines
This forms a critical part of the backdrop behind the headlines we’re seeing these days around the Houthis targeting Red Sea shipping with the US and UK + allies launching missile strikes against onshore Houthi military facilities. The legitimacy of any government is being able to a) have an effective “monopoly on violence” over the areas it (wants to) controls, b) being able to provide key political, economic, social and environmental services to the population, c) protect people against internal and external threats, d) being recognised by a critical mass of the international community as legitimate and and e) demonstrating delivery on stated promises to the above. The Houthis arguably struggle on each of these factors, and the focus on the conflict with the West shields internal issues over its ability to effectively provide for its population stemming from corruption, entrenched tribalism, and heavy taxation to fund the war. Efforts to improve underlying water scarcity, for instance, have hit major roadblocks: in a recent episode of the Climate Diplomacy podcast, the lack of willing local backers for improvement works means international groups are engaged to provide funding and technical assistance. In the existing security environment, this often leads to accusations of foreign interference and espionage. The intersectionality of gender within this space - for instance, women in Yemeni society have far less physical mobility, and women-led social enterprises receiving climate finance often have more equitable distribution of impact - suggests the challenge to mitigate security risks via improving livelihoods will remain a monumental challenge.
The Houthis are keen to be seen as legitimate over all of Yemen - most of all from the Saudis. Ultimately, that’s driving the surge in attacks against shipping in the Red Sea - greater global focus and regional “prestige" equals leverage to get the West and Saudis to focus back on a peace deal. Even if peace talks resume and a deal is signed down the road, the persistent internal governance issues, exacerbated by both acute and chronic environmental stress worsened by climate change, is likely going to be another source of destabilisation for the country for at least the medium term. That has broadly negative pressures for a wide range of security concerns ranging from onshore commercial assets, the safety of energy infrastructure across the border in southern Saudi, maritime shipping through the Bab al-Mandab and levels of piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
Sadly, I’m fearful that there’ll be little movement to really improve the underlying infrastructure in the country that will reduce insecurity for the population until there are successful peace talks followed by sustained scale-back in violence.
What else caught my eye
🇲🇭 Interesting podcast from Lawfare on how the Marshall Islands, one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to climate change impacts, is adapting - and how geopolitics plays into the country’s planning.
🇭🇹 Haiti’s environmental protection brigade is now transforming into another armed militia.
😩 Tying geopolitical risk into investing decisions is hard - it’s (A LOT) more than just adding another indicator to your stock screener. Big opportunity for robust frameworks - maybe looking at the evolution of ESG and sustainability criteria for inspiration.
💬 The World Bank hosts its annual Fragility Forum in Washington DC from 27-29 February, with a focus on the nexus of climate change and war - and the threat it poses to progress and future work in the development field. I hope that there is a greater focus on tapping into private sector innovation and new policy ideas to make successful project outcomes stand the test of time.
Battelle’s annual climate resilience conference is also going to be in DC at the end of April. I went last year and it was very eye-opening - though it could have used a much bigger dose of private sector engagement to balance out the consultant and national lab contingents.
The Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping. and Peacebuilding (that is a mouthful!) is looking for a climate, peace and security expert.
Bedrock Learning is a DC startup looking to shake up learning and information sharing in the national security / policy space. They’re looking for a deputy director of intel.
SIPRI is looking for a climate and conflict researcher.
A Chicago firm is hiring for a climate resilience consultant.
📢 Check out my mate Eftychios Mantas’ blog on his site - a fellow security risk management industry veteran whose background in the development and humanitarian world gives him unique insights into how the “big picture” impacts daily lives and often-difficult choices to keep people safe.
See you in a few weeks wherein I’ll talk more about some fantastic recent research on scaling comercialisation around adaptation solutions.
I’ll leave you with this (I may never make another meme again):